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Case No. 20160285-CA 
IN THE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
VRA TISLA V ROGER BILEK, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals the revocation of probation entered on a 
conviction for kidnapping, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2016). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Vratislav Roger Bilek kidnapped and brutally assaulted two women 
in his home within one month of each other. After Bilek pleaded no contest 
to a single kidnapping charge, the trial court placed Bilek on probation. 
Within less than forty days, Bilek detained another young woman in the 
motel where he was staying, sexually abused her, and, using his cell phone, 
took nude photographs and videos of her while she was unconscious due to 
drug use. Based on two voyeurism offenses and six other probation 
violations, the trial court revoked Bilek's probation and sent him to prison. 
Did the trial court act within its discretion when it revoked probation 
based in part on its decision that the surreptitious photographing and 
recording of a nude, unconscious woman using a cell phone constituted 
voyeurism? 
Standard of Review. Questions of law - such as the proper 
interpretation of the voyeurism statute- are reviewed for correctness, while 
the ultimate decision to revoke probation is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, if if11-12, 997 P.2d 314. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-9-702.7 (West 2015). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In consolidated cases involving two victims, Bilek pleaded no contest 
to a single second degree felony kidnapping charge and was placed on 
probation. R1824; 1838-40. Three months after sentencing, the trial court 
found that Bilek had violated eight conditions of probation; the court 
revoked probation and reinstated Bilek's prison sentence. R1941. Bilek 
challenges the revocation of his probation. 
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A. Bilek's conviction for kidnapping. 1 
Bilek faced aggravated kidnapping, assault, and drug-related charges 
in two separate cases based on two incidents where he lured women to his 
apartment, detained them for several days, and assaulted them. 
1. Underlying facts leading to kidnapping conviction. 
L.M. met Bilek at a 7-Eleven gas station where he offered to give her a 
ride to his house. R149. L.M. stayed at Bilek' s house for three to four days. 
R136-37, 149. He provided methamphetamine, which they both used. R150. 
After the first day, Bilek started to attack L.M. R149-50. He tackled her, hit 
her in the face and body, tried to suffocate her, and strangled her almost to 
the point of unconsciousness three times. R150-51. Bilek displayed a black 
handgun to L.M. as a "shock tactic." R143, 151. He tied L.M. to a chair and 
later locked her in a basement closet for seven to nine hours. R137, 141, 144, 
151. 
When L.M. told Bilek that she was thirsty, he let her go upstairs alone 
to get a drink, apparently believing she would not try to escape because she 
was naked. R151-52. But L.M. seized the opportunity, unlocking the front 
door and running to the next-door neighbor's house. R69, 147, 152. L.M. 
told the neighbor, who was outside working in his garage, that Bilek had 
1 Because Bilek pleaded no contest and the cases never went to trial, 
the facts are drawn from the preliminary hearing for each case. 
I 
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held her at his house for two days. R72-73. L.M. was naked, had a bloody 
\ 
nose, had cu ts and a lump on the side of her head, and was bruised all over 
her chest and legs. R69, 86. The neighbor took L.M. inside, got her a blanket, 
and called 911. R73, 77-78. L.M. said, "Roger's had me locked in a closet for 
two days and he just beat the crap out of me and I need to get away. He's 
going to kill me. He said he's going to kill me if I leave." R78. 
Less than a month later, Bilek met J.B. at a motel where he had gone 
to buy drugs and she had gone to sell them. R148, 735. J.B. asked Bilek for a 
ride so she could avoid being seen by a family friend who had pulled up. 
R735. J.B. agreed to go to Bilek' s house and, once there, they decided that 
J.B. would rent a spare room, paying with methamphetamine. R735-36, 744. 
As Bilek gave her a tour of the house, he showed J.B. a revolver and 
ammunition. R736, 759. 
Later that day, when J.B. was in the spare room with the door locked, 
she noticed an unusual light bulb that made her suspect that Bilek had set 
up a camera in the room. R737. She got a chair to reach the light and 
unscrew it, and as she was doing so, Bilek began pounding on the door. 
R737, 747. J.B. let him in, and Bilek began to argue with her about 
unscrewing the light bulb, ignoring him, and playing music too loudly. 
R737, 747. J.B. went into the bathroom attached to the bedroom, started to 
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fill the tub, and told Bilek to leave so she could take a bath. R737. Bilek said 
he could wash her back for her, and when J.B. refused and told him to leave 
again, he became aggressive. R737, 750. Bilek blocked the doorway so J.B. 
could not leave. R750. J.B. tried shooting Bilek with a Taser that she carried 
for protection, but the charge was too weak to be effective. R737, 757, 762. 
Bilek then grabbed J.B. by the back of the neck and shoved her head under 
the water in the bathtub. R737. J.B. was able to kick Bilek off, but then Bilek 
repeatedly forced his fingers into her vagina and rectum, and he grabbed 
her breasts and put his mouth on them. R737-38, 741, 753. 
J.B. was able to get out of the bathroom, but the fight continued in the 
bedroom. R738. Bilek grabbed her face and tried to gag her by putting his 
finger in her mouth, which she bit. R738. He grabbed J.B.'s hair from behind 
when she was on the floor, pulling her head back to the point she thought 
her back would snap. R738, 753. He grabbed a nearby vacuum cord and 
tried to wrap it around J.B.'s neck, but J.B. was able to stop Bilek by hitting 
him hard between the eyes. R738, 752. Eventually, Bilek relented and J.B. 
was able to go into the bathroom to wash blood off herself. R738. When J.B. 
grabbed her bag to leave, Bilek took it and dumped everything out. R757. 
Later, Bilek dragged J.B. down the stairs and into the basement 
bedroom, where he tried to rape her. R740. J.B. prevented him from doing 
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so by kicking him any time he tried to undo his pants, but Bilek "kept 
slamming" his fingers into J.B.'s vagina and rectum. R740. Even when each 
~ 
attack ended, J.B. never felt that she could leave "[b]ecause he wasn't done 
with me." R741. 
At some point during that day, Bilek and J.B. had both used 
methamphetamine. R735-37. Bilek wanted more drugs, but J.B. said she did 
not have any more so they would have to go get some. R739. As they 
walked out to the garage, J.B. quickly turned around and ran back into the 
house, locking Bilek out. R739. Bilek began hitting the door with a 
sledgehammer so hard that J.B. could see the door move. R739, 742, 767, 
772. J.B. hurried to the front door but could not get it unlocked. R739. She 
ran out the back door and headed toward the fence, but when she saw Bilek 
coming around the corner, she quickly returned to the house and locked the 
door behind her. R739. Bilek shattered the glass door with the 
sledgehammer. R739, 742. As J.B. tried running from him, Bilek hit her in 
the back with the sledgehammer. R739. J.B. fell on the ground, and Bilek 
shoved the handle of the sledgehammer up her vagina. R739, 752-53. Later, 
Bilek hit her in the back of the head with his revolver. R753. "Roger would 
always come from behind to hit me," J.B. explained. R753. "[H]e didn't 
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come from the front to attack a person." R753. At some point, Bilek also 
stabbed her in the arm with a grilling fork. R740, 753. 
By 2:00 a.m., J.B. developed a ruse to convince Bilek to let her out of 
the house. R750-51, 761. She told him her uncle could bring them more 
methamphetamine, and Bilek would not have to pay for it because she was 
getting it from her uncle. R741. He gave J.B. her phone, which he had taken 
earlier, and she pretended to call her uncle. R760-61. When J.B. said her 
uncle was there and pointed out the front door to a car parked just around 
the corner, she said Bilek could not come with her or he would have to 
"deal with my uncle." R741. Bilek reluctantly let her outside, keeping her 
phone as security, but once she was free, J.B. yelled back that she was never 
returning. R760-62. J.B. went to a neighbor's house and they called the 
police. R741. 
2. Trial proceedings. 
In the case involving L.M., the State charged Bilek with aggravated 
kidnapping, distribution of a controlled substance, and aggravated assault. 
R16-17. In the case involving J.B., the State charged Bilek with aggravated 
kidnapping, four counts of object rape, two counts of aggravated assault, 
possession of a controlled substance, and sexual battery. R217, 776-77. The 
trial court later consolidated the two cases for trial. R1521-22. 
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The State was unsure that it would be able to get L.M. or J.B. to testify 
at trial, but J.B. had testified at a preliminary hearing and the trial court had 
ruled that several of L.M.' s statements could come in as excited utterances 
under the hearsay rules. R1763-64, 1818-19. Less than two weeks before 
trial, Bilek entered into a plea agreement with the State, and the trial court 
approved it in advance under rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
R1824. Bilek pleaded no contest to second degree felony kidnapping in the 
case involving L.M., and the State agreed to dismiss all other charges with 
prejudice and recommend sixty months' probation. R1828. Bilek agreed to 
several conditions of probation, including that he would have no overnight 
female visitors without prior approval from Adult Probation & Parole 
(AP&P). R1828. The trial court accepted the plea, imposed a suspended 
prison term, and placed Bilek on probation. R1828, 1838-40. 
B. Bilek's probation violation. 
1. Underlying facts leading to probation revocation. 
Within days of being placed on probation, Bilek drove to a restaurant 
on North Temple at 4:00 in the 1norning and saw E.C. standing in the 
parking lot. R1838-39, 1962-63, 1966-67, 1989-90. Bilek asked E.C. if she 
needed a ride, which she took to mean he was "looking for a girl." R1963-
64. E.C. wanted money for drugs, and she expected to provide Bilek with 
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"some kind of sexual service" in return. R1964-65. Bilek took E.C. to a 
motel, paid her for oral sex and for allowing him to take nude pictures of 
her, and then took her home. R1966, 1987-88, 1990. Bilek saw E.C. several 
times after this initial encounter and paid her for oral sex. R1966-67, 1984-
85, 1989-90. 
After a couple weeks, E.C. was arrested, but Bilek bailed her out and 
offered to take her to his motel room where she could "shoot up meth." 
R1967-69. E.C. injected methamphetamine, then they drove to the homeless 
shelter where Bilek purchased heroin and crack cocaine for E.C. before 
returning to the motel. R1970-71. E.C. used all three substances, but Bilek 
only used methamphetamine in front of E.C. R1973. Bilek supplied the 
methamphetamine that both he and E.C. used, but he used his "new stuff" 
while he gave E.C. his "old stuff." R1973. The methamphetamine E.C. took 
did not have its usual effect on E.C.; it made her feel tired and sick instead 
of awake and warm. R1973, 1982-83. But the heroin had its usual effect on 
E.C., causing her to fall asleep even while sitting up. R1974. 
E.C. spent three days with Bilek in his motel room after he bailed her 
out of jail. R1976. At times, Bilek tried to touch E.C. in sexual ways and she 
refused, but due to the effects of the drugs, she could not stay awake to 
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physically stop him. R1992-94. One time she woke up naked on top of a 
naked Bilek, but she had not undressed herself. R1975, 1987. 
During the three days, Bilek would frequently get mad at E.C. and 
"yell a lot," pacing back and forth for a long ti1ne. R1993. Although he never 
hit E.C., she did not feel safe when Bilek was mad and she felt she could not 
leave, though Bilek did not physically stop her from trying. R1993, 1995. 
Whenever Bilek became mad, E.C. said she was "scared that those stories of 
those other girls might be true, that he might really be lying to me." R1994. 
In the motel room, E.C. had seen "files" that Bilek had collected on L.M. 
Rl 976. She also found "files" that Bilek had collected on E.C., with her 
mother's address and a Google Maps picture of her mother's house along 
with other information about E.C.'s background. R1976, 1980. E.C. tried to 
rip them up but was not able to destroy them all. R1976. 
On the third day that E.C. had been with Bilek-forty-one days after 
Bilek was placed on probation-Bilek's probation supervisor and another 
agent with AP&P did a field visit at the motel. R1838, 1998. When Bilek 
came to the door, the agents saw E.C., who was not dressed for the cold 
weather outside and "appeared like she had been there for a while." R1999. 
Bilek had told E.C. to lie and say she was only staying with him for the day, 
which she did. R1977. When one of the agents called E.C.'s mother to check 
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out her story and found it to be false, E.C. acknowledged that she had 
stayed there for three days. R1976-77. 
The agents searched Bilek' s motel room and found heroin, 
methamphetamine, several syringes, and a cylinder that is commonly used 
to ingest controlled substances. R2004-05; 2015-16. The agents also searched 
Bilek' s phone, with his consent, and discovered several pictures of E.C. 
R2003-04. In all the pictures, E.C. appeared to be "either passed out or had 
no idea that the photos had been taken." R1887-88, 2004. In some, she was 
fully naked, sometimes lying unconscious on a fully naked Bilek. R1887-88, 
1975, 1979-80, 2004. A search warrant was later obtained for the phone, and 
a detective found over 180 pictures and nine videos of E.C. R1887-89, 2018. 
There was also a picture of E.C.' s photo identification. R1887, 1980. The 
digital time stamps on the pictures demonstrated that E.C. was in Bilek' s 
motel room throughout at least one entire night. R2020-26. E.C. was not 
aware that Bilek had taken any of these pictures or videos of her. R1975. 
2. Probation violation proceedings. 
AP&P filed a probation violation report alleging three violations: the 
presence of an overnight female guest; possession of methamphetamine; 
and possession of heroin. R1840; 1843; 1865. AP&P later amended the report 
to include five more violations: forcible sexual abuse, distribution of a 
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controlled substance, two counts of voyeurism using an electronic device, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. R1865. The trial court held a joint 
preliminary hearing on whether to bind over the new charges and an 
evidentiary hearing on an order to show cause addressing the alleged 
probation violations. R1857; 1954. 
Regarding voyeurism, Bilek argued that the statute required the cell 
phone to be concealed, but Bilek used it in the open. R2030. The trial court 
rejected that argument, reasoning that "when someone is unconscious or 
asleep it is concealed from them." R2036. The h·ial court bound the criminal 
charges over and also found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bilek 
had willfully committed each of the eight probation violations. R1040, 2037-
40. 
Arguing for a second chance at probation, Bilek claimed that the no-
overnight-guest provision and several other special conditions were 
"dropped'' by the trial court at sentencing. R2048-49. The trial court stated 
that it did not recall imposing anything other than the standard conditions 
at sentencing but that Bilek had agreed to the special conditions. R2049. 
Regardless, the court stated, Bilek had violated the standard conditions by 
violating the law. R2049. The court thus revoked probation and imposed the 
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original prison sentence of one to fifteen years. R2050-51. Bilek timely 
appealed. R1944. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bilek challenges his probation revocation on the sole ground that the 
trial court erred in concluding that Bilek' s actions qualified as a violation of 
the voyeurism statute. He does not challenge the trial court's willfulness 
finding. And he does not challenge the trial court's findings as to any other 
probation violation. Rather, he argues only that the voyeurism statute 
requires a cell phone to be concealed when filming or photographing, and 
that his cell phone was not concealed because he held it out in the open 
when filming and photographing an unconscious woman. 
But the trial court would have revoked Bilek's probation even 
without the voyeurism offenses. Probation may be revoked based on a 
single violation, and Bilek had six other serious violations, including 
forcible sexual abuse. And even if Bilek did not commit a violation by using 
a qualified electronic device to film or photograph E.C., he committed the 
lesser-included offense of visual voyeurism by viewing his unconscious 
victim under circumstances in which she would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Furthermore, Bilek's violations were reminiscent of 
the conduct that led to the underlying kidnapping conviction. A different 
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result was not likely here, regardless of whether the trial court got the 
statute wrong. 
In any event, Bilek misreads the statute. The statute prohibits the use 
of several enumerated devices to photograph, film, or view a person in a 
situation in which the person would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The statute then includes a catchall category of "other equipment 
that is concealed or disguised." The conceahnent requirement applies only 
to the catchall category-not the enumerated devices- thus expanding, and 
not limiting, the category of prohibited devices. Reading the statute 
otherwise would render superfluous the requirement that any device be 
used secretly or surreptitiously. Furthermore, Bilek' s reading of the text is 
inconsistent with the structure of the statute, which treats any viewing that 
has the potential to create permanent and reproducible images as more 
culpable than other methods of viewing a person. 
Alternatively, the trial court correctly concluded that whenever a 
person uses a device to photograph or record an unconscious individual, 
that device has been concealed. Particularly in this case, Bilek actively tried 
to prevent E.C. from knowing that he was recording her with his cell phone. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
revoking Bilek's probation where the revocation was 
supported by several serious probation violations. 
The trial court may revoke probation upon a finding that the 
defendant willfully violated the conditions of probation or presently 
threatens the safety of society. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(ii) (West 
Supp. 2016); State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). A 
"finding of willfulness merely requires a finding that the probationer did 
not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." State v. 
Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Further, the prosecution must prove the violation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. Still, probation revocation is within the 
trial court's discretion. See State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 82-83 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The evidence of a probation violation is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings and this Court should substitute its 
own judgment for the trial court's "only if the evidence is so deficient as to 
render the [trial] court's action an abuse of discretion." State v. Maestas, 2000 
UT App 22, ,r 12, 997 P.2d 314. 
Bilek challenges the trial court's probation revocation only on the 
ground that the court erred in concluding that he violated the voyeurism 
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statute. Aplt. Br. at 5-8. Bilek contends that under the voyeurism statute, 
any electronic device had to be concealed or disguised. Aplt. Br. at 7. He 
argues that his actions did not violate the voyeurism statute because his cell 
phone was not concealed or disguised when he held it out in the open to 
photograph and record an unconscious E.C. Aplt. Br. at 7. Bilek argues that 
without the voyeurism violations, the trial court would not have revoked 
his probation. Aplt. Br. at 8. 
Bilek's challenge to his probation revocation fails for several reasons. 
First, the trial court would have revoked probation even without the 
.: 
voyeurism offenses as interpreted by the court. Bilek committed six other 
serious violations. And even if his cell phone had to be but was not 
concealed to qualify as a class A misdemeanor, Bilek still would have 
committed the lesser-included offense of class B misdemeanor voyeurism. 
Second, the plain language of the statute does not support Bilek's argument. 
While a photographic camera of any type-such as the cell phone here-
must be used secretly or surreptitiously, it need not also be concealed or 
disguised. The "concealed or disguised" descriptor applies only to "other 
equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.7(1) (West 2015). Third, even if the 
statute required the device to be concealed, the trial court correctly 
concluded that when a defendant takes pictures or videos of an unconscious 
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person without knowledge or consent, the device is concealed within the 
meaning of the statute. 
A. The trial court would have revoked probation based 
on Bilek's other probation violations. 
In Utah, "a single violation of probation is legally sufficient to 
support a probation revocation." State v. Legg, 2014 UT App 80, ,r11, 324 
P.3d 656. Thus, even if Bilek did not violate the voyeurism statute, reversal 
is inappropriate where this Court is confident that the remaining violations 
"would have resulted in a revocation of probation." See id. if 25. Bilek' s six 
remaining violations would have almost certainly resulted in revocation 
because the violations were serious and were similar to the situations that 
led to his original sentence. 
At the probation revocation hearing, the trial court judge stated that 
when he went home the day he originally sentenced Bilek, he was "not 
happy about what [he] had done that day." R2050. He said that Bilek was in 
a class by himself, "a manipulator" who "belongs in prison" because he is 
"a danger to people." R2049-50. A different conclusion on the voyeurism 
allegations was not likely to have led to a different result. Less than forty 
days after being placed on probation, Bilek was doing the same type of 
things that got him put on probation in the first place: luring women to his 
abode, detaining them, using drugs with them, and sexually violating 
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them.2 Based on Bilek' s speedy recidivism, the trial court found that Bilek 
had violated the terms of his probation. Rl-2; 2034-40. Besides the 
voyeurism offenses, the trial court found that Bilek violated probation by 
having an overnight female guest, forcibly sexually abusing E.C., possessing 
methamphetamine and heroine and paraphernalia, and distributing drugs. 
R1840, 1843, 1865. Given the facts in this case, it is not reasonably likely that 
the trial court would have reached a different conclusion even without the 
voyeurism violations. 3 
Furthermore, even if the trial court inappropriately found that Bilek 
violated the elech·onic-device voyeuris1n statute, Bilek certainly violated the 
visual voyeurism statute. Voyeurism using a qualifying electronic device is 
a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-9-702.7(2). But without the use 
of a qualifying electronic device, voyeurism is a class B misdemeanor. Id. 
2 Although Bilek did not face any sexual offense charges in L.M.' s 
case, she ran from his house naked. 
3 Bilek suggests that the no-overnight-guest condition was dropped. 
Aplt. Br. at 3, 4. Bilek made that argument below, but the trial court found 
that Bilek had agreed to it as a term of his probation. R2048-49. 1940. Bilek 
has not attempted to show that the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous, nor could he. Bilek' s plea agreement clearly reflects the no-
overnight-guest condition as a term of probation, the probation officer 
testified that it was one of the conditions, and the sentencing minutes list it 
as a condition. R1828, 1940, 1997. Bilek has provided no sentencing 
transcript or other evidence to demonstrate that the trial court's conclusion 
was clearly erroneous. 
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§ 76-9-702.7(5). The statute thus provides for a voyeurism conviction even 
when no "instrumentality" is used to view the victim: 
(4) A person is guilty of voyeurism who, under 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1) 
[electronic-device voyeurism], views or attempts to view an 
individual, with or without the use of any instrumentality: 
(a) with the intent of viewing any portion of the 
individual's body regarding which the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not that 
portion of the body is covered with clothing; 
(b) without the knowledge or consent of the individual; 
and 
(c) under circumstances in which the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.7(4). Because Bilek challenges only the use of a 
qualifying device and not any other element of the voyeurism statute, the 
trial court's finding of a willful violation necessarily applies to the lesser-
included offense of visual voyeurism.4 
Because "a single violation of probation is legally sufficient to support 
a probation revocation" and Bilek' s remaining violations "would have 
4 In the context of his concealment argument, Bilek briefly notes that 
E.C. had consented to him taking nude pictures in exchange for money on 
their first encounter. Aplt. Br. at 7. But Bilek does not argue that the trial 
court clearly erred in finding that he acted "without ... consent" under the 
voyeurism statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.7(1)(b), (4)(b). Regardless, 
E.C.' s prior conscious consent did not establish carte blanche for Bilek to 
later remove her clothing and photograph and film her while she was 
unconscious. 
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resulted in a revocation of probation," the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in revoking Bilek's probation. See Legg, 2014 UT App 80, 1111, 25. 
B. The requirement in the voyeurism statute that 
electronic devices be concealed or disguised applies 
only to other equipment not specifically listed. 
The voyeurism statute prohibits the use of several specific devices to 
view, photograph, or record a person. But when the statute refers to devices 
that are "concealed or disguised," that language modifies only the catchall 
tenn "other equipment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.7(1). In other words, 
the concealed-or-disguised requirement was intended to broaden and not 
limit the devices covered by the statute. 
Id. 
The relevant portion of the statute provides in full: 
(1) A person is guilty of voyeurism who intentionally uses a 
camcorder, motion picture camera, photographic camera of any 
type, or other equipment that is concealed or disguised to 
secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, record, 
or view by electronic means an individual: 
(a) for the purpose of viewing any portion of the 
individual's body regarding which the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not that 
portion of the body is covered with clothing; 
(b) without the knowledge or consent of the individual; 
and 
( c) under circumstances in which the individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Under a plain reading of the statute, "concealed or disguised" 
1nodifies only "other equipment" and not "camcorder, motion picture 
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camera, or photographic camera of any type." See id. If the statute required 
each of these devices to be concealed or disguised, it would render 
superfluous the II secretly or surreptitiously" portion of the statute. Yet, 
statutes must be interpreted to II give meaning to all parts" to II avoid 
rendering portions of the statute superfluous." State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, 
,r 23, 309 P.3d 209. Thus, "any interpretation which renders parts or words 
in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided." State v. Hunt, 906 
P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995). 
For the statute to be read as Bilek suggests, "concealed or disguised" 
should precede the equipment list: A person is guilty of voyeurism who 
intentionally uses a concealed or disguised camcorder, motion picture camera, 
photographic camera of any type, or other equipment to secretly or 
surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, record, or view by electronic 
means an individual. 
The concealed-or-disguised language modifies "other equipment" as 
a way to encompass devices not ordinarily known to be used to videotape, 
film, photograph, record, or view by electronic means.· For example, 
including in the statute "other equipment that is concealed or disguised" 
protects against a person using Google Glasses to video someone and then 
claiming that the glasses were not a "camcorder, motion picture camera, [or] 
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photographic camera of any type." The statute would also cover any 
makeshift device a perpetrator could jimmy rig in order to conceal it; the 
disputed language in the statute ensures that the conduct is covered even if 
the defendant argues that the alteration to the device no longer makes it a 
camcorder or other enumerated item. In other words, "other equipment that 
is concealed or disguised" is meant to expand the list of prohibited items, 
not limit it. 
Limiting the concealed-or-disguised requirement to O other 
equipment" is consistent with the statute's structure. When interpreting the 
text of a statute, the Court must consider "the statute as a whole." Craig v. 
Provo CihJ, 2016 UT 40, ,I33 (emphasis omitted). As noted, the voyeurism 
statute punishes voyeurism using a qualifying "instrumentality" as a class 
A misdemeanor, while visual voyeurism is a class B misdemeanor. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-702.7(2), (4), (5). Furthermore, the distribution or sale of 
images obtained using an instrumentality is a third degree felony, unless 
the victhn is under 14 years old, in which case it is a second degree felony. 
Id. § 76-9-702.7(3). The sh·ucture of the statute thus evinces a recognition 
that use of a camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of 
any type brings a certain permanence and magnification of the harm 
suffered by the victim. Because a picture or video can be permanent and 
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reproducible, the statute punishes such offenses more severely. In this case, 
for instance, without the use of the cell phone, Bilek and only Bilek would 
have viewed E.C.'s nude body in his motel room over the course of three 
days, but no longer. But because Bilek produced over 180 picture and 9 
videos of E.C. while she was unconscious, he drastically magnified the 
harm he caused, increasing not only the potential that he could continue to 
view the images, but also that others could do the same-even if only those 
involved in the criminal justice system. 
Interpreting the statute the way Bilek suggests would leave the 
statute incapable of addressing many issues it was intended to address. For 
example, Bilek's reading would provide a lesser punishment for the 
quintessential Peeping Tom who peers into a neighbor's bathroom window 
unnoticed and take pictures without concealing or disguising the camera. 
Although the perpetrator would still be culpable of a class B misdemeanor 
under Bilek's formulation of the statute, the harm from his actions-secretly 
or surreptitiously creating a reproducible image of the victim-is exactly the 
type of harm the statute sought to prevent by treating the offense as a class 
A misdemeanor. 
Bilek argues that his reading of the statute is necessary "to exclude 
from criminal liability a situation where a person is taking photographs of a 
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partner who knows about and consents to his presence (and his use of a cell 
phone) in the room." Aplt. Br. at 7. Implicit in Bilek's argument is the 
assumption that knowledge of a partner's presence and possession of a cell 
phone amounts to consent for that parh1er to use the cell phone to 
photograph and record the individual "under circumstances in which the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-9-
702.7(1)(c). Even if that assumption were sound, Bilek's argument does not 
provide a reason to narrow the applicability of the statute. By the statute's 
plain terms, the partner cannot be guilty where he or she has "the 
knowledge or consent of the individual." Id. § 76-9-702.7(1)(b). Clearly, if the 
partner consents, there has been no violation of the statute. To suggest that 
the II concealed or disguised" language is necessary to protect against ~uch 
situations only reaffirms that Bilek's reading runs afoul of the rule against 
rendering portions of a statute superfluous. See Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ,r 23. 
Therefore, Bilek' s cell phone- a II photographic camera of any type" -
need not have been concealed or disguised to meet the statutory 
requirements. 
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C. Alternatively, the cell phone was concealed from the 
victim because Bilek filmed or photographed her only 
when she was unconscious. 
Even under his own interpretation of the statute, Bilek's conduct 
satisfies the elements of the statute because he concealed his cell phone from 
E.C. by using it to film or record her when she was unconscious and 
unaware of its use. Thus, even if the statute requires all electronic devices to 
be concealed or disguised, the cell phone here was concealed. 
Dictionaries define "conceal" as follows: 1) "to prevent disclosure or 
recognition of : avoid revelation of : refrain from revealing : withhold 
knowledge of : draw attention from : treat so as to be unnoticed"; 2) "to 
place out of sight : withdraw from being observed : shield from vision or 
notice." Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 469 
(Meriam-Webster 1993).5 
As the trial court stated, by using the phone only while J.B. was 
unconscious, Bilek concealed the device. R2036. E.C. testified that she was 
unaware that she was being recorded or photographed. R1975. And in one 
video, Bilek quickly put his phone down, while it is still recording, as soon 
as E.C. regained consciousness. R1889. In other words, by using the camera 
5 See also Dictionary.com, "Conceal," http:/ /www.dictionary.com/ 
browse/ conceal ?s=t (last accessed November 14, 2016) ( defining "conceal" 
as 1) "to hide; withdraw or remove from observation; cover or keep from 
sight"; and 2) "to keep secret; to prevent or avoid disclosing or divulging"). 
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and video functions of the cell phone only when E.C. was unconscious, and 
by putting the phone down quickly as soon as E.C. awoke, Bilek attempted 
to "prevent disclosure or recognition of" the fact that he was using the cell 
phone to photograph and film E.C. See Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary Unabridged 469 (Meriam-Webster 1993). He was anxious to 
"avoid revelation of," "refrain from revealing," "withhold knowledge of," 
and "draw attention from," his use of the device. See id. He treated the 
device in such a way "so as to be unnoticed." See id. And when E.C. woke 
up, Bilek was quick to "place [it] out of sight," "withdraw [it] from being 
observed,'' and "shield [it] from vision or notice." See id. In short, Bilek 
concealed the device. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bilek' s 
probation because Bilek committed eight serious violations-even if two of 
those violations only amounted to class B misdemeanor voyeurism rather 
than class A misdemeanor voyeurism. Furthermore, Bilek' s challenge to the 
voyeurism statute conflicts with the plain language and context of the 
statute. Alternatively, he concealed his cell phone by deliberately using it to 
photograph and film his victim only when she was unconscious. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm. 
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Utah Code Annotated§ 76-9-702.7 (West 2015) Voyeurism offenses--Penalties 
(1) A person is guilty of voyeurism who intentionally uses a camcorder, motion 
picture camera, photographic camera of any type, or other equipment that is 
concealed or disguised to secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, 
record, or view by electronic means an individual: 
(a) for the purpose of viewing any portion of the individual's body regarding 
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not 
that portion of the body is covered with clothing; 
(b) without the knowledge or consent of the individual; and 
(c) under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation 
of Subsection (1) committed against a child under 14 years of age is a third 
degree felony. 
(3) Distribution or sale of any images, including in print, electronic, magnetic, or 
digital format, obtained under Subsection (1) by transmission, display, or 
dissemination is a third degree felony, except that if the violation of this 
Subsection (3) includes images of a child under 14 years of age, the violation is a 
second degree felony. 
(4) A person is guilty of voyeurism who, under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection (1), views or attempts to view an individual, with or 
without the use of any instrumentality: 
(a) with the intent of viewing any portion of the individual's body regarding 
which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not 
that portion of the body is covered with clothing; 
(b) without the knowledge or consent of the individual; and 
(c) under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. 
(5) A violation of Subsection (4) is a class B misdemeanor, except that a violation 




1 for rebuttal . 
2 THE COURT: All right , let ' s turn again , staying in 
3 the same order, Ms . Chesnut , any argument on the preliminary 
4 hearing? 
5 MS. CHESNUT: Yes , your Honor , I do have argument . 
6 With regard to Count 1, forcible sexual abuse , in this case 
7 what we have is evidence that I think essenti ally in a nutshell 
8 is that there was some level of sexual acti vity that took place 
9 during the days in question . I t ' s a l ittle b i t unclear exactly 
10 what that was . But I think that the real issue here would 
11 potentiall y be consent . 
12 I think what we have is evidence that the alleged 
13 victim in this case has no memory of giving consent , but I 
14 don ' t thi nk we have overt evidence there was not consent . 
15 There was clearly a relationship here involving sex and drugs 
16 that had been going on for some days if not weeks . And there 
17 is no overt evidence that it was not consensual here . 
18 I see the State ' s alleging that there is a potential 
19 that E- cllllll was not conscious or somethi ng to this effect 
20 while some activity was taking place . But we also have 
21 evidence that is -- that she would sometimes be doing such acts 
22 and then l ose consci ousness . There was clearly a lot of drug 
23 use going on. I think in the circumstances, even for 
24 prel iminary heari ng standard, the lack of consent is not shown 
25 by the State . 
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1 Likewise , with Count 2, distribution of controlled 
2 substance, - ~'s testimony was that -- that she went 
3 with Roger to the homeless shelter to purchase these drugs, 
4 that it was something that they were doing together. At the 
5 very least she was aiding in that . I think that it -- it could 
6 easily perhaps be bound over as a simple possession, as a joint 
7 possession of purchasing drugs or using drugs or -- or 
8 possessi ng drugs, but I think it is inappropriate to bind over 
9 as distri bution of control led substance . I think that I would 
10 object to that and request instead it be bound over on simple 
11 possession of controlled substance . 
12 Now, next, we have two counts of voyeurism . In 
13 reading the e l ements of that offense, one of the elements is 
14 that the defendant intentionally used a camcorder, motion 
15 picture camera, photographic camera of any type or other 
16 equipment, most importantly that was conceal ed or disguised as 
17 secretly or surreptitiously videotaped, film, etc . Here , we 
18 have seen pictures of the photographs and some videos , and I 
19 I see nothing to indicate that these were done by concealed 
20 device or -- or some kind of disguised device . 
21 Now, I understand that perhaps she wasn ' t conscious 
22 during that time . But regardless of that one of the elements 
23 is still that it has to be concealed, and I don ' t see any 
24 evidence that that occurred. It appears to be standard 
25 photographs taken by a cell phone from in fact a short distance 
77 
2030 
1 away. So I would argue the State has not proven that element 




We submit with regard to Count 5, paraphernalia. 
THE COURT : Mr . Ever shed? 
MR. EVERSHED: Yes, your Honor, the victim said that 
6 she did not consent to any of those photographs. She wasn't 
7 aware of them. And not only that, but we have under 76-5-406 
8 that it is, an act of this nature is without consent of the 
9 victim under any of the following circumstances, which includes 
10 under (5), the actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware 
11 that the act is occurring or physically unable to resist. 
12 THE COURT: But the argument is, the statute and the 
13 charging document says that this was done with some type of 
14 equipment that was concealed or disguised to secretly 
15 photograph or videotape. 
16 MR. EVERSHED: So, your Honor, I was first addressing 
17 the forcible sexual abuse argument. 
18 
19 
THE COURT: Oh, sorry. 
MR. EVERSHED: So -- and I will and I will get to 
20 the voyeurism argument. So when it comes to the forcible 
21 sexual abuse, we have her testimony that says that she didn't 
22 know that these things were going on, that she was unaware that 
23 these photographs were being taken. And in -- we have the 
24 photographs that show that she is indeed unconscious, in fact 
25 in almost every one of them if not all of them she is 
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1 unconscious. And then we have her holding his penis while her 
2 head is unconscious on his pelvis very near his penis. So she 
3 is unconscious, and under the statute that is not -- not 
4 consenting. 
5 When it comes to the distributions -- to the 
6 distribution of a controlled substance she said that is the 
7 defendant offered the drugs to her, it was the defendant that 
8 was hiding methamphetamine in bread, it was the defendant that 
9 took her, someone with no money, with no drugs, down to the 
10 shelter, it is the defendant that purchased the drugs, that 
11 purchased the cocaine, that purchased the heroin, that 
12 purchased methamphetamine, and then provided these drugs to 
13 her, and she is in there for three days passed out, and he 
14 takes photographs of her. So I think that that establishes the 
15 distribution count. 
16 When it comes to voyeurism, she is unconscious. She 
17 doesn't know these photographs are being taken. She doesn't 
18 know these videos are being taken. And she is nude in the 
19 bathroom. She has a privacy interest that everyone does, when 
20 you are on the toilet, naked, that you don't expect people to 
21 be taking photographs of you. She is unconscious in that 
22 state. And then she is also nude on top of him. 
23 And then some very key and I think important evidence 
24 here was that last video, as she is beginning to arise and wake 
25 up, what does he do? All of a sudden he shuts down, closes it, 
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1 hides the phone. Your Honor, that is voyeurism. He knew what 
2 he was doing. He knew he was recording. He knew she wasn't 
3 consenting to it. And he was about to get caught, and so he 
4 hid it. And that establishes the elements of voyeurism. 
THE COURT: Any response, Ms. Chesnut? 5 
6 MS. CHESNUT: Yes, your Honor. I will respond first 
7 to the voyeurism. Um, I -- I don't disagree that there would 
8 perhaps be a reasonable expectation of privacy here where it 
9 was a bedroom, and I don't think we are going to comment one 
10 way or the other about knowledge or consent. But regardless of 
11 those two, one of the clear elements here is it has to be 
12 concealed or disguised. And I think that it requires more than 
13 just the person isn't aware that photographs are being taken. 
14 It has to be actually concealed or disguised. That's the plain 
15 language of the statute. And so there is absolutely no 
16 evidence here that that is happening. 
17 I take issue a little bit with the State's 
18 presentation of the facts that Mr. Bilek then hid the camera 
19 when she was waking up. I don't think there is clear evidence 
20 what he did. The camera goes off. We don't know what he did. 
21 But be that as it may, whether he did or not, there was no 
22 recording going on at that time, because the recording ended. 
23 There just is not any evidence of concealed or disguised. And 
24 so I maintain my objections to Counts 3 and 4. 
25 Just briefly with regard to Count 2, distribution, 
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1 again, um, I think the State is focusing, instead of the 
2 purchase of drugs at the homeless shelter, on the taking of 
3 drugs together, which Mr. Bilek already had in his possession. 
4 I think that in this case we end up looking at the situation 
5 where, well, if two people get together to do drugs, which this 
6 clearly was, and one has the drugs with him already, and they 
7 do the drugs, is that distribution? Well, I think that given 
8 that they got together in agreement to do drugs, I think that 
9 it is a real stretch to call this distribution. Again, I would 
10 argue that it should be bound over as simple possession. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Well, taking these comments 
12 as motions to dismiss I will bind over on different charges. 
13 With respect to Count 1 I think I am going to require the State 
14 to amend Count 1 to conform to the evidence. As I recall, the 
15 statute says whoever takes indecent liberties with another or 
16 causes another to take indecent liberties with that person, 
17 which I don't see alleged here. 
18 But I think Count 1 the evidence is sufficient to 
19 bind over on that charge, viewing the photographs, viewing the 
20 videos in several of those, and they will speak for themselves. 
21 But she is, in my view, after viewing them fairly clearly, 
22 unconscious or asleep. Her face is in or near the pelvic area 
23 of the person who she says is Mr. Bilek, the only one in the 
24 room the entire time she was there, and the photographs taken. 
25 So I think that fits within the language of the statute but 
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1 isn't charged here that he -- or causes another to do those 
2 things to himself. So I think Count 1 needs to be amended to 
3 reflect that language that's in the statute, unless I'm just --
4 MR. EVERSHED: It is in the statute, and it's not --
5 the State will make such an amendment. 
6 THE COURT: I think it needs to allege that he caused 
7 her to, and with that addition amendment deny the motion on 
8 Count 1. 
9 Count 2, I don't think I'm just dealing with this 
10 scenario, but I do believe it is a distribution for two people 
11 to get together and use drugs. I have them in my pocket. I 
12 give you some. I think that's a distribution. But here, 
13 taking the testimony in the light most favorable as I do, and 
14 without weighing credibility, she had no controlled substances. 
15 They went somewhere. She directed someone -- directed 
16 Mr. Bilek to someone who she believed had controlled 
17 substances. He obtained them, and then allowed and gave 
18 some or sold some in exchange for what she says is sexual 
19 favors. I think that's a distribution. I will deny the motion 
20 to bind that over on a third-degree felony. 
21 Counts 3 and 4, the Information charges and the 
22 statute does say that, but it seems to me that the key notion 
23 here, and I think one that, taking the evidence in the light 
24 most favorable to the State, causes me to deny the motion to 
25 bind them over is the notion that -- that not that no one know 
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1 there is a computer, for example , in a room, but that the 
2 recording be done surreptiti ously. Now, that 1 s normally f airly 
3 difficult if someone is aware there is a camera set up in a 
4 room over in the corner, it is very difficult to say that ' s 
5 concealed . And Ms . ~ I don ' t think talked about seeing a 
6 phone or computer . She di d talk about using a computer . 
7 But , nevertheless , I don ' t think it ' s a notion that 
8 it simply has to be concealed all the time . It has to be 
9 concealed while the act of recording is occurring, not that 
10 not that no one -- that no one knows that there is a computer 
11 in the room or a phone , but that the recordi ng be concealed . 
12 And it seems to me here that it ' s a reasonable 
13 inference that when someone is unconscious or asleep it is 
14 concealed from them, it is surreptitious as to that person who 
15 is asleep, even though that person may earlier have seen a 
16 computer or a camera or a cell phone while the recording is 
17 going that ' s surreptitious . So I don ' t think that it needs to 
18 be a situation where someone has no idea there is a phone or a 
19 computer or a camera, simpl y that during the recording it be 
20 surreptitious . 
21 So I will deny the motion on Counts 3 and 4, and on 
22 Count 5 the evidence is such that I think I find in all five 
23 counts there is probable cause , Mr . Bil ek, to beli eve that all 
24 five of those counts occurred and probable cause to believe you 






























I will bind you over on all five of those counts . . The matter 
will be assigned to Judge Hogan . I will set an arraignment and 
further conference in front of him on April 5 at 8 :30 in 
courtroom 31. 
As to the case ending in 1370, the probation 
violation matter let me just say with respect to the 
voyeurism counts on that , I don ' t think it -- I think my 
analysis is sufficient , but having viewed briefly in open court 
here what the State called video 5 contained within Exhibit 1, 
which is February 1 at 4 : 11 - - I mean 4 : 29, my recollection, 
and, again, it speaks for i tse l f , is it showed for something in 
the range of 15 to 20 seconds what appeared to me to be 
Ms . C- again asleep or unconscious and while her face was 
near the pelvi c area of the person she says was Mr . Bilek . He 
was the only one in the room . 
And after about 15 seconds she began t o stir or move, 
and then the -- I can ' t say what happened, but the recording 
went off . There was still noise in the background, music in 
the background, could hear s ome voices , so something was 
obviously still recording, a t least audio, but it went -- I 
will just say went black or dark , clearly wasn ' t recording the 
same scene after she began to stir . So the State ' s argument , I 
don ' t reject it , but I don ' t say I know what happened, but 
factual l y , from vi ewing it , that ' s what occurred . 
As to the order to show cause , again, there was 
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1 originally an affidavit filed by Agent Cook on February 4 with 
2 three allegations . It was amended on February 22nd to add five 
3 more all egations . The first three , of course , were that he had 
4 E- CIIII, a female , stay in his room from January 30 to 
5 February 2nd, in violation of special condition, which Agent 
6 Cook read here today. I find by a preponderance of the 
7 evidence that that is true and it has been established and 
8 amounts to a knowing violation of probation . 
9 As to Count 2 - - or allegation No . 2, that he 
10 possessed methamphetamine on or about February 2nd, Ms . e-
ll testified that she saw Mr. Bilek use what she believed to be 
12 and discussed as methamphetamine . Again, overall , on all of 
13 these matters , the standard is that I must find by a 
14 preponderance of the evidence a knowing and willful violation 
15 of the conditions of probation . And so accepting her testimony 
16 at that level , I find allegation No . 2 to be true . 
17 No . 3 dealt with heroin . I find that to be true as 
18 well . The testimony is from the agents and the officer that 
19 material was found in the nightstand . And while there 
20 certainly are and possibly, arguably , in a jury trial 
21 alternative hypotheses which are reasonable, here with the 
22 standard being a preponderance, discussions of use of and 
23 providing to Ms . C- of those substances , methamphetamine 
24 and heroin, the presumptive or NIK tests, which, according to 
25 t his officer ' s experience, have proven to be almost universall y 
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1 · correct , I don ' t proclaim to be any great expert but have been, 
2 either as a defense l awyer or a prosecutor or a judge since 
3 1971 , I have probably seen and dealt with hundreds and hundreds 
4 of NIK tests . I am aware, only one comes to mind where there 
5 was a positive NIK test that proved to be by laboratory 
6 analysis incorrect . So I can only think of one where I have 
7 seen that in 45 years . 
8 So at t hat leve l I think the NIK tests are 
9 presumptivel y sufficient for a preponderance standard to 
10 demonstrate that those materials were heroin and 
11 methamphetamine . I find a l l egations 2 and 3 to be true and a 
12 knowing violation of probation . 
13 As to allegation 4, the allegation of forcible sexual 
14 abuse, I have discussed that at a higher level of proof . A 
15 preliminary heari ng requires probable cause . And I think 
16 that ' s a higher level than preponderance . But even if it 
17 isn ' t , based upon, again , the photographs , the discussion of 
18 Ms . ~' I find by a preponderance that that occurred as 
19 we ll . 
20 Allegation 5, the dist ribution, again that ' s in 
21 common with the analysis in the pre l iminary hearing aspect , and 
22 find by a preponderance of the evidence that that occurred and 
23 a willful v i olat i on of probati on . 
24 Allegations 6 and 7 of the affidavit , again , are 
25 Counts 3 and 4 of the Inf ormation . The same anal ysis applies 
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1 again here , i n my belief, a l ower standard, but even if it 
2 i sn ' t a lower sta0dard , from viewing the photographs and 
3 videos , 19 photographs and five videos , they i ndeed all appear 
4 to show Ms .. ctlllll in an unconscious state . So c l early no 
5 consent . 
6 And some of them she is f ully clothed . Some I will 
7 say partially . In two I can see a man ' s hand, one rubbing her 
8 back on one occasion, and other areas on the side of her upper 
9 torso and down near her buttocks, and she appears to be totally 
10 unaware . And I think by the standard of proof necessary f or 
11 this type of hearing, I find allegations 6 and 7 to be true and 
12 knowing violations of probation . 
13 Allegation 8, that he possessed i tems of drug 
14 paraphernalia , the testimony again of Ms . ctlllll and the Agents 
15 Cook and Fiedler, that items were found in the ni ghtstand in a 
16 drawer and in the bathroom, while, again, beyond a reasonable 
17 doubt may be more of a quest i on, at this level , by a 
18 preponderance, two people in a room, she says she , Ms . cllllll 
19 testified, and I give sufficient credence to her testimony to 
20 find by a preponderance that he provided the syringes , and so I 
21 find allegation No . 8 to be true by a preponderance of the 
22 evidence and a knowing and willful violation of probation . 
23 So on those eight findings I find Mr . Bi lek has 
24 violated the probation willfully and knowingly . And so the 
25 bindover has been ordered . What do you want to do with 
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1 disposition on 1370? Any reason to get further information? 




MR. EVERSHED: I know that AP&P is requesting prison. 
5 Agent Cook is here, can speak to that. And the State is 
6 arguing vehemently for the same thing. 
7 
8 
THE COURT: Mr. Torrence? 
MR. TORRENCE: Judge, Mr. Bilek's preference would be 
9 to delay sentencing on the order to show cause until after the 
10 trial on the new criminal charges. That seems appropriate 
11 given the serious nature of the new criminal charges. Although 
12 the Court has found there is a preponderance of the evidence, 
13 if it turns out that a jury finds that he is innocent of some 
14 or all of these charges, I think that would weigh very heavily 
15 toward giving him another chance on probation. 
16 So his preference would be to delay sentencing on the 
17 order to show cause until after the verdict on the trial. I 
18 understand from Ms. Chesnut that that is expected to happen 
19 fairly soon. It is not a case that's going to be delayed for 
20 months and months and months. So that would be our request to 





THE COURT: Mr. Torrence? 
MR. EVERSHED: You mean Mr. Evershed? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. EVERSHED: Your Honor, we are here on an OSC 
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1 allegation. He was on probation. The standard is different 
2 than beyond a reasonable doubt. You have found him in willful 
3 violation of his probation. And a jury doesn't declare anyone 
4 innocent, they just find if what happened in this case 
5 (inaudible) standard. ~ 
6 In this case we did. He has been proven by a 
7 probable cause standard and by a preponderance standard to have 
8 done these deeds 41 days after being on probation. This man 
9 deserves to be in prison now and await his trial on the new 
10 case. We have every one here. The agent's here. We are ready 
11 to argue it. And we prefer just to go forward. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Given the nature of the 
13 proceedings, Mr. Torrence, I will deny the request. I am ready 
14 to go forward. I will be glad to hear from you and then from 
15 the State and then from you, Mr. Bilek, on what you suggest I 
16 ought to do. When I say deny the request, deny the request to 
17 
18 
put disposition over. 
MR. TORRENCE: Okay, Judge, Mr. Bilek does want to 
19 say a few words. Before that I would say, again, obviously, 
20 this is his very first probation violation. As the State 
21 indicates, this was some 38 or 40 days after he was out. The 
22 allegations all have to do with things that he was doing with a 
23 woman who by her own admission went there to use drugs with 
24 him, (inaudible) prostitute, to trade sex for drugs and sex for 
25 money. Everything was very consensual in that nature. 
89 
2042 
1 The only thing that's alleged to be unconsensual were 
2 the very same things that she agreed to do while she was awake. 
3 She testified that she gave him oral sex in return for money 
4 and drugs. And in the videos we see simply her head resting on 
5 him. We don't even see any sexual activity. So certainly 
6 everything that's filmed is certainly less than what happened 
7 when she was awake and what she agreed to. 
8 With regard to drugs, again, she indicates that he 
9 got these for her. That was the main point, to provide them 
10 for her. Again, certainly, that would still be illegal, but, 
11 again, this was not anything he was causing her to do that she 
12 was not already inclined to do. 
13 So given that, that this was basically a totally 
14 consensual arrangement by her own testimony, I would ask the 
15 Court to give Mr. Bilek another chance on probation, obviously 
16 require that he do intensive drug treatment. It could even be 
17 an inpatient drug treatment program. 
18 But in terms of him being charged with forcible 
19 sexual abuse, again, this was all, everything we have seen 
20 was -- was activity that she already agreed to do when she was 
21 conscious and that she was doing in return for money and drugs. 
22 So I don't think those allegations are enough to warrant 
23 imposing a prison sentence at this point. Thank you. 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Evershed, State's position? 
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1 MR. EVERSHED: Would you like to hear from me or from 
2 Agent Cook? ~ 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 3 
4 MR. EVERSHED: I'm happy to speak and then Agent Cook 
5 as well. Your Honor, this is his first allegation, but 
6 while -- this is the worst thing he could have done. He preyed 
7 on another woman, another vulnerable, drug-addicted woman he 
8 found on North Temple at 4:00 a.m. He then bailed her out of 
9 jail several weeks later, provided her an intense level of 
10 drugs, where, I mean, it was just nonstop. She was just taking 
11 drugs the whole time. ~ 
12 And, your Honor, when it comes to this courtroom and 
13 like every courtroom I have had the privilege to be in, I think 
14 most people have a genuine, an earnest feeling like we are just 
15 trying to help people. AP&P agents, your Honor, defense 
16 attorneys, even prosecutors, where we are just trying to help 
17 people overcome addictions, overcome anger issues, overcome 
18 whatever. 
19 The defendant is in a class of his own. This 
20 sentencing is not about helping him or rehabilitating him. 
21 It's about protecting society from him. He is a -- in the 
22 truest sense of the word a predator. And, your Honor, we have 
23 just reached the tip of this iceberg. 
24 He took a woman, and he took a photograph of her 
25 identification. The reason why that's significant to me is 
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1 because in that Sandy case , which is also here to be - - to be 
2 discussed as well , in a room later his ex-wife found a box of 
3 copies of identificati ons of other women. And who knows how 
4 many other women he has done similar things to , where he has 
5 hel d ·them in their house -- held them in his house, they become 
6 unconscious , and he does things to them. It is atrocious. 
7 And now let's consider the names of i.-~ 
8 and~~- They didn ' t want to participate, but we 
9 will speak for them today . They deserve this man to go to 
10 prison . What each of them had to endure by him is just 
11 t errible . But he chooses hi s victims well . He chose this 
12 vi ctim . He chose those two other victims. They didn ' t want to 
13 eventually -- well, one never wanted to participate and the 
14 other one did, and which is just too bad . 
15 But from that we got a second-degree felony , and he 
16 was on probation for only 41 days . I mean what man, who is 
17 trying to become rehabilitated, who i s trying to become better, 
18 who is t r ying to prove himself , then does the same thing that 
19 he was doing before ? 
20 Your Honor, the only regret the State now has is I 
21 hope that the Board of Pardons doesn ' t think that t hi s is some 
22 light kidnapping . If this man is released out of prison under 
23 a day of 15 years it would be a tragedy to this community. He 
24 needs to be hel d in there. I don ' t know what I can do or what 
25 anybody else can do to communicate to him that this is seri ous . 
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1 He gets out, and there is going to be more victims in his way. 
2 And with that the State is asking for prison. 
3 THE COURT: I think I will pass and hear from 
4 Mr. Bilek first. So, Mr. Bilek, I will be glad to hear from 
5 you. You don't have to speak. If you want to say anything, I 
6 will be glad to consider it. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: I will do my best to explain and kind 
8 of prove that Mr. Persecutor [sic] is so wrong, dead wrong on 
9 everything. Nobody, not even my attorney, agree to explain the 
10 whole reason behind -- behind all of these charges against me. 
11 I'm going through a difficult divorce, which is 
12 public information. It's nothing I can lie about. My wife is 
13 threatening openly that -- with this scenario, that I am going 
14 to end up in the court -- end up in the jail or court, because 
15 she -- she going to find the people that they going to say that 
16 I did this or that, which is dead wrong. 
17 Um, my wife, I have witnesses, and I had my -- my 
18 evidence, written statements from people that my wife was 
19 hiring people to harm me physically, to get me into trouble 
20 with the law, that she was paying these -- these individuals 
21 money to make statements and kind of get me where I am at 
22 today. We are talking about $800,000 total assets in my 
23 divorce. And this -- this is not coincident that this happened 
24 in the middle of my divorce asset division. I'm very, very 
25 angry. I'm really upset about Mr. Persecutor [sic] trying to 
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1 make some kind of a monster out of me, which is all nonsense. 
2 First of all , I was charged by circumstantial case 
3 with 1- ~ - She -- she was completely incompetent to 
4 testify . So the case was stricken, because she couldn ' t 
5 testify. I was told from my attorney that I should --
6 MR. TORRENCE : We are not going to get into things 
7 you and I talked about . That ' s confidential . 
8 THE DEFENDANT : Well , a long story short, um, I -- I 
9 was advised that the only way that --
10 MR. TORRENCE: We are not going to talk about what I 
11 advised you. That ' s confidential . 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Well , I just -- I 'm not guilty of 
13 any -- any of the accused things . My wife is behind the whole 
14 scene . She -- she wiped out completely our finances. She paid 
15 these girls for hi re to say things that I came at them or 
16 whatever, which is not true . 
17 I was unable to hire a pri vate investigator. I was 
18 trying to contact the police, but they refused to -- to do 
19 anything. They said to just contact my divorce lawyer . I was 
20 openly threatened by my wife that -- just briefly, my wife is 
21 behind the whole scene, and I don ' t feel that -- that I have 
22 any fault in this. I was investigating on my own . I had to 
23 pretend that I am doing drugs to get 
24 
25 
MR. TORRENCE: (Inaudible) information . 
THE DEFENDANT: All right , I guess I - - I'm not 
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1 allowed to say much about it, so --
2 THE COURT: Well, of course, you should always follow 
3 the advice of your lawyers. They are good, experienced 
4 lawyers. But let me just tell you that the issue here is you 
5 were placed on probation. They have alleged you violated that 
6 probation. I found that to be true. The question is you need 
7 to convince me or show me why I should not send you to prison 
8 or impose that sentence now given that state of affairs. So 
9 that's really what all you need to be addressing, and you have 
10 done that in part by blaming your wife. But anything else you 
11 want to tell me about why I shouldn't send you to prison? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Well, my -- my telling you about the 
13 whole thing was this was a setup and I -- I didn't know 
14 anything about the drugs. 
15 Your Honor, I just want to explain that these 
16 conditions, like no overnight females and all the other 
17 conditions was dropped by you on December 23rd, during the 
18 court date of final judgment, and somehow they got copied to 
19 
20 
AP&P, special court instructions, which I disagreed. 
initial those -- those things, and I mentioned that to 
I had to 
21 Mr. Jerry Cook from AP&P that I disagree with those things, 
22 because they was dropped by you on December 23rd. And so those 
23 conditions should be waived. 
24 Also, I -- I have no objection to -- to go with 




1 mention these things that they was actually waived on 
2 December 23rd in the court, and there was two or three of them. 
3 I can't remember. I never seen the final judgment from that 
4 date, so I can't really tell you. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. Well, I 
6 recognize that Mr. Bilek is in a bit of a difficult position 
7 here given that there is a pending case, and, of course, you 
8 can't really do much talk about that, and those allegations are 
9 in common with the allegations that I found by a preponderance 
10 to be true in terms of violation of probation. 
11 Of course, I sentenced him on December 23rd to 1 to 
12 15 years and suspended that. I don't recall, Mr. Bilek, that I 
13 sentenced you to anything other than the normal and standard 
14 conditions of probation and any treatment. And so even if the 
15 provision about having no females overnight should not have 
16 been imposed, you agreed to it. But even disregarding that, it 
17 certainly is clear and a common and standard and usual 
18 condition of probation that you not commit any new violations 
19 of the law. And the picture I have seen here convinces me 
20 again by a preponderance that you have not lived up to that. 
21 Mr. Bilek, I am not in the habit of calling people 
22 names. I like Mr. Evershed's terminology that you are in a 
23 class by yourself. I think that's a very unique way of putting 
24 it and one that I am tempted to call you names, and I don't 
25 mean in a disrespectful way. But words like evil and monster 
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1 used, the word "monster" I don't attach to people. 
2 But, Mr. Bilek, December 23rd, I will tell you, was 
3 one of those days when I went home and I was not happy about 
4 what I had done that day. Circwnstances combined that I think 
5 resulted in a sentence that I -- no one was happy about. I 
6 think I said that. You weren't happy about it and no one else 
7 was and I certainly wasn't. 
8 But, Mr. Bilek, this young woman who came in here 
9 today, I just -- I don't know, you know, I don't know what goes 
10 on in the Czech Republic. I don't know what caused you to get 
11 where you are. But you are, in my view, a man who belongs in 
12 prison. And I don't have any -- and I will not go home tonight 
13 and feel badly about what I have done today by sending you to 
14 prison today. I don't enjoy it. I don't relish in it. 
15 But I believe that if a prison is designed to keep 
16 people safe from others who can hurt them, you are one that 
17 belongs there, beyond any doubt. I think you are a danger to 
18 people. I think you are a manipulator, Mr. Bilek. You have 
19 come in with this notion of interpreter, and you -- I won't --
20 I don't want to get started. 
21 I think that you violated your probation, clearly in 
22 my mind, and certainly by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
23 underlying offense was serious. This conduct is serious. And 
24 I find a violation of probation, order probation revoked, 
25 terminated unsuccessfully, order you to serve that one to 15 
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1 years in the prison that was imposed but suspended on 
























Thank you all. 
(These proceedings were concluded at 11:49 a.m.) 
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